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INDIAN RIGHTS
Can an Indian Tribe Recover Land
Illegally Taken in the Seventeenth Century?
by Richard B. Collins
County of Oneida, New York
V.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York State
(Docket No. 83-1065)
New York
V.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York State
(Docket No. 83-12,10)
Argied October 1, 1984
ISSUES
In 1795, the state of New York acquired land fron
the Oneida Indian Nation in violation of federal law.
Two New York counties are now record owners of part
of the land. The case now before the Court presents it
with several related questions to resolve. Do the Oneidas
have a federal right to sue the counties for damages
measured by the land's rental value? If so, does the long
passage of time defeat their claim? Or did the federal
government ratify the transaction after 1795, making it
lawful? If the Oneidas recover from the counties, may
the counties recover in turn fromn the state of New York?
FACTS
At the time of' the Revolutionary War, the Oneida
Nation inhabited central New York. The Oneidas sided
with the colonists against the British, and the new nation
rewarded them in a 1784 treaty that secured ownership
of their land. But the state of New York ignored tile
treaty and acquired Oneida land in a series of' transac-
tions. Most of the Oneidas' land, almost live million
acres, was acquired in 1788. After the Constitution was
adopted, Congress passed a law that made acquisition of
Indian land void unless approved by the federal govern-
ment. New York ignore([ this law and specific federal
warnings in 1795, when the state purchased another
100,000 acres of' Oneida land. The transaction was irre-
gular and possibly fraudulent. No chiefs signed for the
Oneidas, and the state paid the Oneidas 50 cents an
acre, then sold the land to settlers for more than seven
times as much.
Richard B. Collins is an Associate Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado, Camipus Box 401, Boulder, CO
80309; telephone (303) 492-5'193.
Issue No. 8
Over the years, the Oneidas protestedl New York's
actions, but no suit was filed until the present action in
1970-175 years after the land was taken. 'rihe Oneidas
sued two New York counties over ownership of 872
acres taken in 1795. They did not seek return of' the
land but asked For damages based on the land's rental
value for the years 1968 and 1969. Despite the limited
scope of the case, all parties agree that its outcome will
affect other Indian claims in New York and other east-
ern states, claims that cover sizable amounts of land.
The lower federal courts dismissed the case based on
lack of federal court jurisdiction, but in 1974, the Su-
preme Court reversed and sent the case back for trial.
The counties then brought the state of' New York into
the case, claiming that as tile original wrongdoer, the
state ought to reimburse the counties for anything the
Oneidas recover. This time the lower federal courts
ruled in favor of the Oneidas and awarded a money
judgment. They'also held that the state must reimburse
the counties.
The counties and state obtained Supreme Court re-
view of their legal clefenses to the judgment. In effect,
they admit the 1795 transaction was illegal but argue
that the Oneidas have no legal remedy, or that defenses
based on the passage of time bar the Oneidas' claim, or
that the federal government retroactively approved the
1795 transaction after that date. The Court asked the
federal government to file a brief stating the views of the
United States, and the federal brief sided with the Onei-
das.
In briefing the case to the Supreme Court, all parties
concentrated on the question of whether the Oneidas
have a federal court remedy for the illegal land taking.
But during oral argument to the Court, the Justices
showed much greater interest in the issues based on the
passage of' time, particularly the question of' a possible
statute of limitations. Those who heard the oral argu-
ment believe that these issues will determine the out-
come.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The background of' this case is more ancient even
than 1795. The European nations that made liscovery
claims in the Americas adopted a rule that acquiring
land ownership from the Indian nations was a sovereign
prerogative and monopoly. Original Indian ownership
was recognized, but the Indians could transfer their
land only to the European sovereign. In the many cir-
cumstances of discovery and conquest, this rule was
often violated. Events were often far from any instru-
ment of crown authority, and the violators had political
power, the Indians none. But the rule remained the
norm, so that violations had to be cured, at least after the
fact, and subjects of the crown who claimed under the
rule usually prevailed over those who violated it.
The United States inherited this rule from the Brit-
ish crown but had to apply it to a federal system. There
is some uncertainty about the law during the Confedera-
tion, but it is settled that tinder the Constitution, the
federal government has plenary control over Indian
affairs. This power was exercised by the First Congress
and by every Congress since. A 1790 law regulated trade
with the Indians and declared void any acquisition of'
land front them unless approved by the federal govern-
ment. This law was renewed in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802
and 1834. The 1834 law remains in effect. The Oneidas
claim that New York's 1795 acquisition violated the 1793
law, and that later laws preserved the illegality. One of
the counties' defenses argues that the claim expired in
1796 with the 1793 law.
Federal Indian policy evolved into a relationship in
which the federal government often acts as trustee of
Indian property, and this trusteeship bears on the issues
before the Supreme Court. It is settled law that the
United States can sue to recover lndiahi property, and
one argument the New York counties make is that only
the federal government can sue to remedy the illegal
1795 transaction, not the Oneidas.
The statute of limitations issue that dominated oral
argument before the Supreme Court is complex. The
only federal statute of limitations for Indian claims ap-
plies expressly to suits by the federal government. It
would not bar land claims, so it does not bar a suit by the
United States to remedy the 1795 transaction, but its
relation to the Oneidas' suit is uncertain. The counties
argue that there is no federal statute of limitations appli-
cable to the Oneidas, and that in this situation, the Court
should "borrow" a state statute tnder which the Onei-
clas' claim would be barred. The Court has done this for
some kinds of legal claims, but it is uncertain whether
the Oneidas claim should be one of them. The Oneidas
and the federal government argue that Congress has
indicated that the tribes' claims should not be barred.
The significance of this case is the subject of consid-
erable discussion in the petitions and briefs before the
Court. The counties argue that a decision against them
will impair private land titles in much of central New
York and in other states, a result the Court should avoid.
They are joined by friend of the Court briefs on behalf
of other New York owners of record, similar parties to
an Indian land claim in South Carolina and the Ameri-
can Land Title Association. The Oneidas emphasize that
similar Indian land claims, particularly one in Maine,
have been settled by Act of Congress without any harm
to private owners. Tile federal brief goes urther. While
supporting the Oneidas on the issues in this case, it
argues that Congress has the power to extinguish the
Oneidas' claim by retroactively approving the 1795
transaction, and that it could do so without any compen-
sation to the Oneidas. It also argues that a number of
defenses not raised in this case by the counties might bar
recovery against private owners of record. The probable
consequences of a decision are argued to the Supreme
Court in many cases, but it is fair to say these questions
are unusually prominent in this one.
ARGUMENTS
For the Counties of Oneida and Madison, New York (C(ountel
of Record, Allan van Gestel, 28 State Street, Boston, AlA 02109;
telephone (617) 523-5700)
1. The Oneidas do not have a cause of action against the
counties tinder federal law.
2. The Oneidas' claim should be barred by the applica-
ble statute of limitations.
3. Rights under the 1793 statute have abated.
4. The United States subsequently ratified the 1795
transaction.
5. The Oneidas' claim presents solely nonjusticiable po-
litical questions.
For the State of New York (Coutel of Record, Robert
Abrams, Attorney General, The Capitol, Albany, NY'12224;
telephone (518) 474-8101)
(The state made the same arguments as the counties'
1, 3 and 4 above.)
1. The counties' claim for indemnity is barred by the
state's sovereign immunity.
2. The state has not consented to the counties' indemni-
fication claim.
For the Oneida Indian Nation of Wisconsin and the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York (Counsel of Record,
Arlinda Locklear, 1712 N Street, NW, Washington, DC
20036; telephone (202) 785-4166)
For the Oneida of the Thames Band Council (Counsel of
Record, Robert T. Coulter, 601 E Street SE, Washington, DC
20003; telephone (202) 547-2800)
1. The Oneidas have a federal common law cause of'
action for trespass.
2. The Oneidas have a federal cause of action under the
1793 statute.
3. The United States has not ratified the 1795 transac-
tion.
4. The Oneidas' claim is not barred by any statute of'
limitations.
5. The Oneidas' claim does not present a nonjusticialble
political question.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
These are summarized in the "Background and Sig-
nificance" portion of this article.
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